



The International Relations Journal

San Francisco State University, Summer 2006



The Unipole Brand

John Yarnall Pryce Rhoades

Resistance Through Interconnection

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The Mass Killing and Genocide Index

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A Look at India's Water Shortage

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The Unipole Brand: Identity and the Scapegoat Mechanism in Lahore, Pakistan

John Yarnall Pryce Rhoades

*I get my advice from the advertising world
Treat me nice says the party girl
Koke adds life where there isn't any
So freeze, man, freeze*

*Koka kola advertising and kokaine
Strolling down the Broadway in the rain
Neon light sign says it
I read it in the paper-they're crazy!
Suit your life, maybe so
In the white house-I know*

—The Clash (Koka Kola)

A popular sentiment today posits a clash of civilizations between the Islamic World and the West. Some argue this clash arises from differences in religion (General Boykin, 2003), while others argue that the division is ideological, revolving around pitted perspectives on governance and freedom (Huntington, 1996). Some others contend that the growing division of wealth and the instability that globalization threatens are the source of the conflict between the developing Muslim world and the rich West (Williamson, 1999). Although these arguments may or may not apply more generally to the conflicts between these two blocs, in the particular case of the riots in Lahore, Pakistan on February 14, 2006, these religious, ideological or classist flashpoints are incidental to the broader issues of identity and legitimacy, specifically within the framework of the international political economy.

Discussing this case is meant to develop and mature ideas on conflict between the Islamic World, represented here by Lahorians, and the West, epitomized by the US. I will attempt to show that the US is perceived to project its economic power and cultural influence via corporate America, i.e. multinational corporations headquartered in the US that market consumer goods. This projection is most apparent in what shall be referred to as the unipole brand, a symbol perceived as a mark of corporate America. Unlike many international theorists who argue that the global system is anarchic, I will argue that there is currently a global governance system (GGS) wielded by economic powers embodied by two groups of non-state actors: international economic organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF (tighter but less powerful), and the collection of global investors, financiers and businesses (looser but more powerful). This global governance structure, although only economic in principle, still represents Western dominance, particularly US dominance, and is resented by people who are subject to and yet underrepresented in it. These people cannot play a role in global governance because they do not have the money to buy into these groups. Utilizing Rene Girard's 'scapegoat mechanism', I will illustrate that those who are marginalized and/or co-opted by the global governance system take out their aggression on the best representation of their oppressor that they can find within city limits: the unipole brand.

The Unipole Brand

The unipole brand both functions as an image of the US, its ubiquity an emblem of US dominance, and is utilized as a scapegoat for frustration from lack of influence in the GGS, which is shaped by US dominance. However, the US is incidental to the unipole brand. The unipole brand is a symbol of oppression to those marginalized by the GGS. If another country were to assume the position of hegemonic leader, shaping the economic course of the world, it would assume the role of oppressor

in the eyes of the marginalized developing world. Until the structures of the GGS are legitimized via democracy or identity restructuring, the developing world will perceive the GGS and its hegemonic stabilizer as oppressors.

The unipole brand can be defined with the help of Barry O'Neill's theory on the importance of symbols in international relations, which has a large basis in his examination of message symbols, which follow a naming rule pattern of THE-TARGET-AS-A-SOURCE.¹ He defines a message symbol as an action that an actor takes in order to communicate a particular message to a specific subject. The actor is a representation of the country, sometimes a state official or an unspecific person, i.e. the COUNTRY-AS-A-PERSON conceptual metaphor. Since it is a symbol, the action is only a microcosmic illustration of the grander message. For example, when George W. Bush holds a press conference with Pervez Musharraf, as a message symbol, it is supposed to communicate the cooperation and shared values between the US and Pakistan.

O'Neill lists a number of ways people can represent a whole country in a message symbol; he states, "The elements mapped in a conceptual metaphor are flexible."² There are two valuable GROUP-AS-A-COUNTRY conceptual metaphors that O'Neill does not draw out, but do play into international relations. One, groups can also serve as the actor representing the country, i.e. GROUP-AS-A-COUNTRY. Two, archetypal icons can represent a country in a message symbol, i.e. ICON-AS-A-COUNTRY. Of course, icons cannot be actors, but they may represent the actions of what they represent. At the very least, icons can be subjects. Those icons can be brands of US MNCs. The Golden Arches or the Coca-Cola logo are prime examples of the country-as-an-icon metaphor.

During the riots in Lahore, franchises that bore conspicuously American brands like the Golden Arches were specifically attacked. Companies recognize the representative power of their logos, both the benefits and the detriments they carry with them. A brand can be valued in the billions of dollars. For instance, a *Business Week* survey published in 2005 ranks the brand of the banking firm Citi at a value of roughly \$20 billion.³ Citi also recognizes the backlash that the power of its logo may suffer. For example, two days after the riots in Lahore, similar protests took place in Karachi, Pakistan, with crowds burning effigies of US president George W. Bush. As a company along the route of the march, Citibank hung a black flag across its logo to hide it from the protesters.⁴

O'Neill concedes that many symbolic messages are interpreted differently than what the actor intended, thus affecting a negative impression of the actor, or their country, on the subject. In the case of the riots in Lahore the COUNTRY-AS-AN-ICON metaphor is useful, but with the icon as the subject rather than the actor.

Newspaper Cartoons

On September 30th, 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* "published twelve different cartoonists' idea of what the Prophet Mohammed might have looked like."⁵ These cartoons are interpreted as satirical by some, insulting by others, and blasphemous by many. On October 20, Danish Imams voiced objections to the cartoons to Danish PM Rasmussen. Although the Prime Minister did not meet with the aggrieved Muslim leaders, he wrote them a letter, stating, "The freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press."⁶ At the time, the issue did not seem to amount to much. Some or all of the cartoons were published over the next several months in countries throughout Europe, such as Norway, France and Germany, all without facing severe protest. Even the Egyptian newspaper *Al Fager* published some of the cartoons on October 17, 2005—albeit with an accompanying article condemning the drawings, without causing any unrest. However, protests in the Muslim world erupted after Danish Muslim delegations, each comprised of the original protesting imams, visited Middle Eastern countries throughout the month of December.⁷

Considering the derogatory portrayal of the Prophet in several of the cartoons, not to mention

the Islamic tradition prohibiting the pictorial depiction of the Prophet, many Muslims around the world were understandably upset. However, the controversy that has emerged has escalated into violent conflict on many occasions. According to one website that monitors the media-reported casualties from the violent conflicts that have boiled up out of anger over the cartoons, 832 people have been injured and 139 people have been killed as of March 6, 2006.⁸ Of course, there is no way of knowing exactly how many casualties are directly or indirectly attributable to the unrest instigated by the cartoons, but there is no doubt that property has been destroyed, diplomatic relations have been damaged and lives have been lost, all over what many US citizens might mistake for the funny pages.

Although several violent incidents flared in response to the cartoons, this paper focuses on the events that occurred on February 14, 2006, in Lahore, Pakistan. On that day, about 15,000 people went to the streets to protest the publication of the cartoons. The demonstration became violent when several protesters “ransacked outlets of international fast food companies, including McDonald’s, KFC and Pizza Hut, and the Norwegian mobile phone firm Telenor.”⁹ These companies are undoubtedly icons of Western culture and globalization; however, one must be careful not to succumb to the popular assumption, perhaps most famously advanced by Thomas Friedman,¹⁰ that whenever a mob in a developing country attacks a Western business it is a classist or Luddist reaction. The case in Lahore is distinct because the rioters were driven by their fury over the blasphemous depiction of the founder of their religion, which has little to nothing to do with class struggle or the ill effects of globalism, yet they still attacked these symbols of the global marketplace and the West, particularly the US.

One might understand how the rioters saw Telenor as an extension of Norway, whose *Magazinet* was one of the first papers to publish the cartoons after the imams made their visits to the Middle East the previous December. However, the attacks on markedly ‘American’ franchises are curious since US newspapers have been largely uninvolved in the cartoon controversy. Still, the Associated Press specifically reported, “American brands were targeted.”¹¹ The goal of this paper shall be to determine why seemingly neutral organizations, particularly the US stores, were attacked in a protest over newspaper cartoons.

The Economic Leader

During the summer of 1944, with the end of the Second World War in sight, the Roosevelt administration convened the Bretton Woods conference to design the postwar monetary order. The US was not yet the world’s unipole—contending with the power of the Soviet Union—it was the main architect of the IMF, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and other monetary policies that came out of the Bretton Woods talks. Furthermore, “The world economy that was being reconstructed was a capitalist one, and the Soviet Union [with its command economy] was not about to abandon its own economic system.”¹² Eventually, the USSR pulled out altogether from the Bretton Woods monetary regime (largely due to Stalin’s desire for economic secrecy). Thus, the United States was left to direct the predominant monetary regime that would grow during, and explode after, the Cold War.

For one thing, the dollar standard was established “as the ‘linchpin’ of the Bretton Woods system[. This entailed that] the dollar was defined by the United States as having a value of $\frac{1}{35}$ of an ounce of gold. Other countries then defined their currency values in terms of the dollar.”¹³ Of course, US liabilities overseas eventually became far greater than US gold reserves, and in 1971 the US formally declared that the dollar was no longer linked to gold. However, even with the value of the US dollar floating independently of any commodity-based reserve asset, “no other government has [ever] been prepared to have its own currency play a significant international reserve currency role.” In addition, the major economic powers do not wish to return to a full-fledged gold standard. And there is no agreement among them to construct any other commodity-based reserve asset. One other option would be to expand an IMF lending program called Special Drawing Rights, created when the US broke the link between the dollar and gold, with the intention of providing some stabilizing force for currency

exchange, but this idea also has little to no support among the leading economic powers. “Today, the world is, in effect, on a dollar standard.” This is particularly stark when one examines “the economies-in-transition: as of mid-1994, sixty percent of all US currency bills printed was destined for circulation abroad, a twenty percent increase from the 1970s.”¹⁴

This global dependence on the US exemplifies the hegemonic stability theory; the inordinate economic power of the US allows it to structure and maintain the extent and rules of global trade, with the intention of prolonging its dominance.

The United States is the global leader in almost every economic measurement of 1999. Among the top thirty leading exporting states, the US commands a share of about 12.4% of global exports, which is greater than the combined shares of the countries ranked from 19 to 30 (12.1%). When it comes to the top importers, the US is even farther above the pack, carrying a share (18.0%) of global imports nearly equal to the combined shares of the next top three importers (Germany-8.0%; UK-5.5%; Japan-5.3%). If we look at “the 10 largest trading countries[, they] account for almost 60 percent of world trade. World trade thus tends to be concentrated among relatively few major traders, with the remaining, almost 200 countries accounting for slightly over 40 percent.”¹⁵ Not to mention that the top thirty exporters and importers control 87.8% and 84.7% of the market, respectively. Even in this wealth-concentrated world, the US is clearly in a class of its own. With a global GDP of roughly \$49 trillion in 2002, the US produced more than a fifth of it (\$10.45 trillion).¹⁶

A major portion of this formidable GDP comes from US corporations. For at least the past three years, over half of the world’s top ten corporations, based on revenue, were headquartered in the United States (including DaimlerChrysler, with one of its two headquarters in Auburn Hills, Michigan). In 2004, the leading corporation, Wal-Mart, with a revenue just over of \$263 billion, ranked 23rd among the largest economic entities in the world, in front of Indonesia and behind Austria.¹⁷ Wal-Mart, and companies like it, invests heavily in its public image in order to improve the bottom line. In 2003, Wal-Mart’s marketing department spent about \$676 million; since then, the company has created a public relations ‘war room’, increasing focus on shaping its public image.

The Unipole Brand

“McWorld” is a popular term meant to illustrate the proliferation of international commercialization, advanced most notably by US MNCs—with McDonald’s as the prototype. Benjamin R. Barber states, “McWorld is a product of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce. Its template is American... Its goods are as much images as matériel... It is about culture as commodity.”¹⁸ That commercialization is what the WTO exists to promote (with the World Bank and IMF lending a helping hand). For example, one mission of the WTO is to lower trade barriers, thus opening more markets to foreign goods. Of course, this means that developing countries have as much of an opportunity to sell their goods in developed countries as developed countries do in theirs. And by many measures open markets serve the interests of developing countries at least as much as they do developed countries. However, the fact remains that US exports to Pakistan are far more conspicuous, in number and nature, than Pakistani exports to the United States. In line with this, partly due to the efforts of international economic organizations, a collection of global investors, financiers and businesses have established investments in Pakistan. The most conspicuous symbols of that FDI are, of course, US MNC brands like McDonald’s, Coca-Cola and KFC, exemplifying the COUNTRY-AS-AN-ICON metaphor.

The term ‘McWorld’ actually grows out of a theory of sociologist George Ritzer’s, called “McDonaldization”—when a subject assumes the characteristics of a fast food restaurant: efficiency, predictability, calculability and control—which is an adaptation of a broader theory by Max Weber called bureaucratic rationalization.¹⁹ Weber states,

...bureaucratic rationalization...often has been a major revolutionary force with regard to tradition. But it revolutionizes with *technical* means, in principle, as does every economic reorganization, 'from without': It *first* changes the material and social orders, and *through* them the people.²⁰

Correspondingly, Ritzer argues that McDonaldization is a form of Americanization, which he identifies as the projection of US power into other countries in business, economic, industrial, or cultural terms.²¹ Weber contrasts rationalization with traditionalism.

As Foucault would note, this binary pair is inherently prejudiced. Taking that into consideration, it may help to illustrate the identity conflict that exists between the rioters and fast food restaurants. Weber claims that traditional society uses informal social controls, such as tradition, to maintain social order, while a rationalized actor, such as McDonald's or the US, maintains order through the rule of law, e.g. formal constitutions or business policies.

Keep in mind many people in the developing world perceive the US and its fast food MNCs in a positive light. "At the opening of the McDonald's in Moscow, one journalist described the franchise as the 'ultimate icon of Americana'...Reflecting on the growth of fast-food restaurants in Brazil, an executive associated with Pizza Hut of Brazil said that his nation 'is experiencing a passion for things American.' On the popularity of Kentucky Fried Chicken in Malaysia, the local owner said, 'Anything Western, especially American, people here love...They want to be associated with America.'²² Like the rioting Pakistanis, all of these people perceive McDonald's, Pizza Hut and KFC as distinctly American.

Indeed, it is important to keep in mind the popularity of the American image throughout the world. But, returning to the concept of binaries, the good often comes with the bad. In the minds of Lahorian rioters, the modernization of the West has not just brought quick, tasty and inexpensive food, it has also brought with it a system of law that protects unabashed blasphemers. It has developed and promoted a world economy that allows the US to project its power over developing countries, such as Pakistan. Without enough money, poor countries are left with few options to express their discontent with foreign countries.

Like any international policy, the GGS, comprised of both groups of non-state actors, is not unencumbered with the issue of legitimacy. Indeed, the GGS, as much as anything, "requires legitimate authority to insure stability and predictability, whether it pertains to trade agreements or basic standards for international monetary policy" or any other international regime that affects the world economy. "However, while a stable and orderly trading and financial system may pertain, not all states view the rules, institutions, and practices of the system as impartial and fair."²³ Indeed, this is the reason why Lahorian rioters literally struck out against the GGS. They perceive the US as masterminding the GGS to enhance its own interests. As citizens in an autocratic, economically weak country, they not only have little to no say in their government, but they certainly have none in the GGS.

The point is not that the Lahorians are reacting to modernization, it is that they are reacting to bullying. The GGS sets rules without consulting Pakistan, and often those rules protect acts that are reprehensible within the borders of the Muslim nation. Pakistanis perceive the GGS as a tool of the US. Resenting that, they have limited options to express their resentment; one of the few is torching a symbol of the US and the GGS—the unipole brand.

Expressing Resentment

In order to explain the attacks on US corporate franchises, in the midst of a conflict that at face value is between the Muslim world and western continental Europe, we must understand how the rioters perceive the conflict. The conflict will be shown to emerge out of resentment of marginalization in the GGS rather than Huntington's theory on ideological strife. Pakistanis feel marginalized because

they have no voice in a global governance system; ipso facto, they deny its legitimacy. Furthermore, they believe that this GGS is run by a self-interested hegemon, the US. Examining the attack against the Telenor company first opens up a discussion that helps to later explain the instances of violence against the US companies: McDonald's, KFC and Pizza Hut. To begin, we must first answer why the rioters attack corporations in retribution for offenses delivered by unaffiliated (in everything but nationality) newspapers.

The philosopher and anthropologist Rene Girard offers a theory about violence that may explain this very circumstance. Although Girard may seem a peculiar source for analysis of international affairs since his case studies are largely ancient literary texts, such as Homer's *Odyssey* or the Bible, his theories on violence are frequently cited in academic discussions about societal violence and are a potential fountainhead of analysis of international conflict. However, a full explanation of the violence in Lahore is not possible without integrating Girard's theory with Alexander Wendt's theories on image and identity. Wendt is an established, innovative voice in the field of international studies, challenging both realist and liberal analysis with his critical theory of Constructivism. Explaining the rationale behind the violence against corporate franchises in Lahore is achieved by coupling Wendt's form of structural theory with Girard's concept of collective persecution.

Girard's analysis of violence pivots on what he calls the 'scapegoat mechanism.' The original concept of a 'scapegoat' emerged from Hebrew tradition, at Yom Kippur "the high priest [would] symbolically place all the sins of the people onto one goat, which was then released into the wilderness, and the same high priest would sacrifice another goat to God. The idea was that the community would then be purified of its sins and violence by casting them all onto these animals, which were then removed from the community sins and all."²⁴ The blame is laid upon a subject. In its origin, this tradition utilized a weak subject, i.e. a goat, but Girard investigates history's other applications of the scapegoat mechanism, explaining that any abnormal existence or behavior in society can face persecution. The more a person or group differs from the norm, the more likely they are to be persecuted.

Usually victims of persecution tend to be social outcasts, e.g. the poor, ethnic minorities, criminals. However, Girard argues that occasionally, in 'periods of crisis', the privileged class suffers the brunt of social persecution. After all, the divine right of kings, descended from the Almighty, certainly sets a monarch apart from the rest of society. Or, dictators, with their totalitarian power, are positioned to face severe persecution in retribution for the oppression they have forced upon their countrymen. "Crowds commonly turn on those who originally held exceptional power over them."²⁵

As an example, Girard cites the persecution of Marie Antoinette, her execution a prime illustration of the scapegoat mechanism. She is 'abnormal' because she is Austrian and the queen, both a foreigner as well as rich and powerful. What separates Girard's scapegoat mechanism from the original sacrificial tradition is that, he argues, the scapegoat does not just have to act as a repository for the community's sins, it can also act as a repository for the suffering of the people. By executing their queen, the French sought a deliverance from the oppression and privation they suffered under the government.

Of his three stereotypes of persecution, Girard's third stereotype explains that the subject of persecution may be chosen because it is, in fact, guilty of committing some crime against the society, in comparison to when the scapegoat is singled out simply because that person or minority is easily established as the other, or 'abnormal.' Although, Girard does not address it specifically, his example of Marie Antoinette, illuminates a derivative of this stereotype, a scapegoat that is a combination of both the third stereotype of prosecution and simply an abnormal member of society; Antoinette was both innocent and guilty. Although the queen had little influence in government decision-making, and thus was not at fault for the famines that ravaged France, she was culpable for its abuses against the people because she was a member of the elite class who lived in opulence while so many starved. Similarly, Telenor, though innocent of any act resembling defamation of the Prophet or Islam, is rooted in a nation that condones the kind of social structure that publishes blasphemous images of Muhammad.

Wendt's constructivism allows us to go one step further towards explaining why US corporations were attacked. Wendt states, "constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theory."²⁶ Thus, trying to explain backlash against globalization as simply an issue of division of wealth is not sufficient for constructivists. In the case of the riots in Lahore, understanding structures of legitimacy and resentment—in terms of the GGS and cultural co-optation, respectively—is necessary.

One major claim of the structural theory is that states are constructed by 'historically contingent interactions', rather than structurally or exogenously given.²⁷ What this means is that states' relationships are mainly formed by shifting impressions, over time, of their own and each other's identities and interests, e.g. "am I/are they" friend or foe?, do "we" share common values?, etc. Two facets of Wendt's discussion of identity are important here: corporate identity and collective identity.

Corporate identity is comprised of the characteristics that make up actor individuality; this is the identity the actor affiliates with itself, made up of its constituent parts. In the case of the nation-state, this includes its population, resources, common values, etc. Collective identity, meanwhile, is the presence of common interests among states. When one state is comparing itself with another, "Identification is a continuum from negative to positive—from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self."²⁸

Thus, Wendt provides a framework with which to determine the significance of the elements that contribute to the rationale—Girard's scapegoat mechanism—behind the attacks in Lahore. Since Pakistan, defined by the COUNTRY-AS-A-GROUP metaphor, exemplified by the rioters in Lahore, has a corporate identity as a Muslim, developing country,²⁹ traditional enough to consider the cartoon depictions of the prophet as blasphemous. Meanwhile, many Pakistanis have formed a negative identification with the US, viewing it as hegemonic and unilateral. This alienation is also extended to US MNCs. The conflict between Pakistanis and the US, especially US MNCs, is apparent.

Pakistan is a Muslim country, and its citizens objected to the cartoons of the prophet because of that corporate identity of the country. However, the country's religious affiliation, in and of itself, does not account for the violence in Lahore against US MNCs. What incites Lahorians to violently protest is the bullying they consider that they suffer under the GGS, i.e. lack of respect of values and lack of representation. The Danish imams felt dismissed when Rasmussen would not meet with them, only sending a letter in response to their objections to the cartoons. Thus they held rallies in Copenhagen. When both of those actions did not engender the kind of consideration they were expecting, the imams voiced their frustrations to their home countries, and other Muslim leaders, who felt their same sense of marginalization, but in the international arena rather than simply the domestic one.

With few resources, Pakistanis have little to no voice in the GGS, and feel similarly frustrated by the European newspapers, such as *Jyllands-Posten* and *Magazinet*, who demonstrated a deliberate irreverence for their religious values. However, since these papers are not easily accessible, nor is the amorphous GGS, the rioters selected a scapegoat that represents the actors who appear not to take Pakistanis into consideration. A representation that both exists because of the current GGS, and incorporates the same rationalist order that exists in countries that affirm the right of anyone to disrespect the sacred: the US MNC.

The rioters in Lahore took out their aggression against a GGS built and governed by the US, perceived as hegemonic and unilateral—marginalizing their voice—by attacking the best scapegoat at their disposal, the country-as-an-icon: the Golden Arches, KFC, and Pizza Hut. These examples of the unipole brand serve as abnormal minorities in Lahore. They are scapegoats, one more step removed from Telenor. Rather than companies based in a country that participated in the blasphemous acts, they represent an economic force that marginalizes and is foreign to Pakistanis. Analogously to Marie Anoinette, they do not dictate the West's emphasis on the freedom of speech, and thus are not at fault

for the blasphemy, but in this globalized world, they do control a large number of the economic levers that shape the GGS, which turns a deaf ear on poor countries such as Pakistan.

Conclusion

The unipole brand is a phenomenon that will remain in the minds of the developed world as long as the formal and unwritten rules of the world's economic order are not, in representative part, shaped by developing countries. These countries' populations will progressively outgrow those of the developed world. They offer the burgeoning markets for the consumer products that bear the unipole brand. Companies and the developed countries whose strength depends so heavily upon the wealth these products create cannot afford to ignore these facts. Masking logos with black flags when the public protests is not a solution. The developing world needs to believe countries, such as the US, are listening to their concerns and respecting their identity before the unipole brand is no longer a target. ■

Endnotes

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Resistance Through Interconnection

Sara Blowers

Marcos is a gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Ysidro... a peasant without land, a gang member in the slums, an unemployed worker, an unhappy student and, of course, a Zapatista in the mountains.

—Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos of the Zapatista Movement

At first a perplexing statement, the meaning of this quotation becomes clearer as one learns more about the global significance of the Zapatista Movement. What began as an indigenous people's struggle in the Chiapas region of Mexico has grown over the past decade to become a model and symbol for successful grassroots resistance. The Zapatista movement thrives not only on its humanistic ideology and decentralized structure, but also through networks of international support. To understand its structure, it is important to study the Zapatista movement before and during its 1994 armed challenge to Mexico's North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) integration.

After 1994, the Zapatista Movement shifted its guerilla tactics into a non-violent, global networking strategy. The media, internet, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) were utilized to spread the Zapatistas' message and gather worldwide support for this initially small and seemingly doomed movement. The Zapatistas began by their refusal to live under a government that was deaf to the indigenous voice and blind to indigenous land rights. Through their development, the Zapatistas have formed a critically designed and internationally supported grassroots movement.

Early History and Development

To understand the Zapatista Movement, it is crucial to examine its origins. Indigenous repression and subsequent reaction has cycled since the dawn of the conquistadors, with the 20th Century bringing actualized indigenous rights. The original indigenous revolutionaries fought from 1910-1919 and called themselves "Zapatistas" in alliance with their leader, Emiliano Zapata. The result of this revolution was the creation of Article 27, an amendment to the Mexican Constitution stating that, "communal landholdings were protected from sale or privatization."¹ As a result, land across Mexico was redistributed to the native populations. Sadly, in the Chiapas region of Mexico, these so-called revolutionaries were actually "landowners banded together to prevent the spread of general uprising in the region."² These landowners struck a deal with the government to unofficially dispense the majority of land into their hands. In 1930, partial indigenous justice was met with reparation of land to the local Chiapas tribes. However, this land was so steep and mountainous that "Campesinos had to tie themselves to trees to plow."³

Large scale immigration into Chiapas began in the 1950s, and resulted in a blending of cultures and ideologies which marks the region today. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Mexican government granted Chiapas land to peasant farmers in other parts of the country, creating a great influx of population to Chiapas.⁴ It was also in the 1970s that the Mexican government began persecuting left-wing intellectual activists, who in turn, fled to the rural areas. One such group, the Forces of National Liberation (FLN), sought asylum in the Lacandon jungle. It was the FLN that later formed the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in November of 1983. This early group of intellectuals "came to the forest like a classic revolutionary Elite in search of a subject, the proletariat in the classic, Marxist-Leninist sense."⁵ These Marxist revolutionaries hoped to lead the indigenous community in revolt against their mutually oppressive government. Instead, the violent revolutionary dreams of the Marxists were calmed somewhat by the decentralized decision making and community cohesion of indigenous groups. This mixture of ideologies resulted in, "a Moltov Cocktail...a mestizo movement that is critical and emancipatory."⁶ In the past, politicians of Marxian philosophy have often succumbed to the temptation of dictatorship. This mixture of indigenous and Marxist culture within the Zapatista movement is probably what has

contained the threat of unequal power distribution and has propelled the effective collective action against the Mexican government. Further solidarity in Chiapas was later realized as Mexico integrated into the global market. The Marxist lens revealed to the indigenous peoples that it was unchecked global capitalism that posed a threat to their agriculturally based communities, cultural cohesion, and human dignity. As a result, the Zapatista community transformed, and “is not exactly a traditional type of rural community clinging primarily to its piece of land and traditions...it is a new type of society...brought about by the production relationships inherent in the latest phases of capitalism.”⁷ The unique outlook of the Zapatistas gives credit to both the assimilation of urban mestizos into the rural lands and the ideas of Marx which helped define the goal of the Zapatistas to preserve cultural unity and stand against the ravages of global capitalism.

To better understand how globalization affected the Zapatistas, one must examine the catalyst to the Zapatista movement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA called for the Mexican government to ban all subsidies on agriculture and open its market, causing alarm in the agrarian-based economy of the indigenous population. With the influx of cheaper American agricultural products, the price of Mexican agricultural goods would be forced downward. Furthermore, NAFTA enabled the sale and privatization of government-owned land to encourage foreign investment and growth. This proposal would render Article 27 completely null, as most government owned land was home to the indigenous farmers. Unable to compete with the foreign market, any indigenous farmers holding land would be forced to sell it and move their labor to another sector. This movement of indigenous labor would uproot cultures that had lived on the land together for thousands of years. The future of the indigenous people was uncertain, as alternative work to farming was not guaranteed to the farmers who lost their livelihood. At this time, the government of Mexico made no attempts to address the indigenous people’s concerns, instead focusing on hiding news of a potential uprising from the U.S. congress.⁸ Thus, the EZLN took it into their hands to find a solution, to reclaim their indigenous land rights and preserve their community.

January 1, 1994 was the planned debut for both the Zapatista Movement and NAFTA. For NAFTA, an integrative economic union would begin. For the Zapatistas, a revolution would begin. The revolution started with an insurgency that consisted of a motley group of between 1,200-1,500 Zapatistas, wearing black ski masks or red bandanas and carrying anything from automatic weapons to nothing at all.⁹ Four hundred Zapatistas took over the capital city of San Cristobal de las Casas, burning the public ministry building and declaring war on the Mexican Army. After six days of fighting in five different municipalities of Chiapas, the Zapatistas retreated back into the jungle, practically disappearing into the tribal communities. Although brief, the uprising created immense pressure on the Mexican government to address the needs of these indigenous groups. Fearing the withdrawal of NAFTA-inspired investors and negative worldwide media coverage, President Salinas called for a ceasefire. On January 6th, he asked the Zapatistas to give up their weapons and promised they would not be persecuted.¹⁰ The Zapatista’s representative, Subcomandante Marcos, replied three days later that “the EZLN was not going to lay down its arms or take of its masks...[but] pledge[ed] to respect a ceasefire if the Zapatista Army of National Liberation was recognized as a belligerent force.”¹¹ This was the beginning of an eleven-year struggle in which the Zapatistas continued to fight for autonomous governance apart from Mexico, however, the nature of the struggle had changed.

Characterization of the Zapatista Movement

Following the initial insurgency, the Zapatista movement was marked by a transition from militancy to diplomacy and a shift from locally based to worldwide support networks. The negotiation between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas took place in the “Aguascalientes,” or designated meeting places on Zapatista-controlled grounds.¹² The Aguascalientes also became a forum that attracted media from across the globe. The media and internet spread the Zapatistas’ ideas globally while NGO’s supported the Zapatista cause and brought in outside aid. The irony in the Zapatista Movement is that

the increased media attention was also a product of globalization bringing economic instability to the region. It is also ironic that the internet, one of globalizations most important communication tool, was used to spread the Zapatista message for autonomy and furthered support for their cause worldwide. The interim years, from 1994-2000, found global support gathering as the Zapatistas maintained their peaceful resistance, inclusive rhetoric, and networks of communication.

January 6th, 1994 marked the beginnings of the age of diplomacy between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government. Despite sporadic military, paramilitary, and police attacks on civilian Zapatistas since the initial insurgence, the Zapatistas themselves have not fired a single shot in retaliation.¹³ Instead, they have opted for the diplomatic route through yearly declarations, frequent communiqués, and activity in the Aguascalientes. The Aguascalientes grew from simple autonomous zones across Chiapas into places where Zapatistas gathered peacefully and built community infrastructure consisting of schools, libraries, and hospitals. The EZLN relinquished military presence over these zones when Subcomandante Marcos “gave ‘Aguascalientes’ to the National Democratic Convention [CND] announcing that the EZLN was retiring...but would obey its dictates, whatever they may be.”¹⁴ Although they withdrew, the EZLN stood reserve at the command of the people since these zones remained under constant threat of the government and other paramilitary groups. The formal peace process between the Zapatistas and the government continued from 1994 until February 1996, and resulted in the San Andres Accords. It took two years for the Zapatistas to negotiate terms of indigenous land rights and autonomous governance since they consulted each measure with the Zapatista tribes for consensus.¹⁵ The San Andres Accords were finalized with the Mexican government agreeing to elevate the rights of the indigenous to a congressional level.

The Mexican government has so far failed to fully implement the goals of the San Andres Accords. Marcos explains this is because “it would signify that 1)...they have not fulfilled their job as good government, and 2) they have been...the principal obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.”¹⁶ So, while the San Andres Accords were a step forward for a Zapatista voice in the government, the current prognosis is that the government is satisfied with keeping the good image of the accords but is not ready to assume the guilt that implementing the accords would suggest.

The Zapatistas continued to pursue reforms for indigenous autonomy by raising awareness through a 1,111 person march into Mexico City in August of 1997. This journey was seen as a success; it marked the government’s official recognition of the movement and raised support from both indigenous and Mexican citizens along the route. This march was followed by the devastating massacre in Acetal, a Zapatista municipality. The December 23, 1997 slaughter included the deaths of forty-five Zapatista people, mainly women and children. The massacre was carried out by an affiliated militant group of the famous Industrial Revolutionary Party (PRI) and was said to have been linked directly to the Mexican government.¹⁷ After attacks from the PRI on four additional Zapatista municipalities, the EZLN withdrew into the rural highlands, while close to 12,000 Zapatistas became refugees fleeing PRI lands.¹⁸ After the Acetal Massacre, the Zapatistas decided to focus on organizing refugees and strengthening both their domestic and global community. PRI-elected President Zedillo had lost the Zapatistas trust to negotiate with the Mexican government. The Zapatista struggle was a continuous fight for survival, for indigenous rights, and for the government’s acknowledgement and implementation of these rights.

A Global Network

The era of globalization, which had ushered in many of the challenges the Zapatistas faced, also brought with it their greatest weapon and asset: a global communications network. The extended communications network is said to have aided the Zapatistas in their initial conflict with the Mexican government. It was the fear of negative media exposure and subsequent loss of NAFTA-based investor confidence that kept President Salinas from completely annihilating the movement.¹⁹ The media and

the internet also helped to gather aid and support from foreign NGOs after the initial insurgency. Both local and foreign NGOs played a large role in organizing and overseeing peace talks, documenting human rights abuses against the Zapatistas and organizing media attention.²⁰ The spectrum of NGOs ranged from Amnesty International to the World Policy Institute, and thus created the need for the Coalition for Non-Governmental Organizations for Peace (CONPAZ) to organize all the various NGOs involved in Chiapas.²¹ As the message of the Zapatista movement spread, other “Zapatista” support movements began in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy. On May 1st, 1998, one such Italian support group called “Basta ya!” flew into Mexico City to provide protection for Zapatista communities after the Acetal massacre.²² Even though this particular support group was forced to leave the country before their 10-day visas expired, this type of outside support was not uncommon.²³ Like fighting fire with fire, the Zapatistas relied on the support of global networks of foreign NGO’s, the internet, and the media to help save them from the devastation to their traditional way of life brought on by global economic integration.

One aspect of the Zapatista Movement which attracted NGO attention was its structure, which consisted of decentralized, community based action. A popular idea in Zapatista discourse is that the internet helped reinforce the structure movement by mirroring its decentralized decision-making and diffusing, yet multiplying, its power.²⁴ It is interesting to note that the internet communications networks and design of the movement functioned together in a correlative way. The internet reflected Zapatista resistance to hierarchal structures with its free flow of information and voice, and at the same time it was a mode through which the free flow of information could be transported instantly and without limit.²⁵ It should also be stated that the goal of the EZLN, despite its guerilla activity, was never to take power, only to disperse power back to the people of Chiapas. This captured power from the insurgency was effectively multiplied and decentralized through the online social networks of support strategy. These networks were also effective in “muddling the government’s efforts to crush the insurgency, contrary to the fate of most previous armed rebellions.”²⁶ Because of the elusive nature of the internet, the Mexican government had no idea how to stop these communications networks, prevent global activist support, or how to fight a peacefully based resistance movement under the watchful eye of the world. The internet was the perfect revolutionary tool for the Zapatistas, allowing them to gather supporters from across the globe while confusing government efforts of subversion.

Although its popularity has spread through the media and the internet, the Zapatista movement also gains global support through its universally attractive dialog and symbols. The Zapatista rhetoric has extended to integrate all ethnicities, nationalities, and sexes into a common struggle for the minority voice to be heard and needs to be met. Martinez-Torres suggests that this open acceptance into the Zapatista movement can be credited to the various migrations into Chiapas and resulting “jungle’s hybrid identity.”²⁷ Although initially composed of indigenous groups and the urban Mestizos from the city, Marcos extended the Zapatista identity to include, “A gay in San Francisco...a gang member in the slums,” and all other oppressed groups.²⁸ The inclusion of the Zapatista movement reflects the globalized nature of our world, in which diverse people can share their struggle against oppression and resistance through communication. Extension of the Zapatista struggle to others may also be a powerful tactic to gain constituents from around the globe who relate to the movement’s rhetoric. Similar to the dialog, the symbols that identify the Zapatista movement represent its message of inclusion. A definitive mark of Zapatismo is wearing a black ski mask or red bandana over ones face. By hiding their identities, the Zapatistas perpetuate equality amongst their ranks, unify their cause, as well as draw curiosity to their hidden identity “to see their long neglected faces.”²⁹ While the act of wearing the mask remains exclusive to the movement, the symbolic significance of the mask as dispersing single authority, unifying all people, and forcing attention on previously unseen issues gives universally understood power to this symbolic act.

The unique non-violent tactics, support networks, and inclusive dialog of the Zapatista Movement have promoted both its popularity and existence. Although it began as a guerilla army, the Zapatistas

have successfully shifted into to a non-violent communication strategy with the government. Ironically, products of the globalized information network, the media, internet, and NGO's, were the greatest weapons against globalization's economic harm. The Zapatista's revolutionary rhetoric and ideology of interconnectedness have expanded its message and helped draw aid to Chiapas. Overall, the Zapatista movement, due to its negotiation strategy, utilization of support networks, and truly inclusive viewpoint, has created the ideal community grassroots organization.

The Future of the Movement

The Zapatista Movement continues today, changing its organizational structure but not straying from its original goal for indigenous autonomy. On August 8, 2003, the Zapatistas announced that the Aguascalientes would cease to exist, while the Caracoles, centers for meeting, and its new Good Government Juntas were created. This governing body would provide social services for the indigenous people, as well as govern indigenous affairs according to the rights given to them at the San Andres Accords in February of 1996.³⁰ Due to bureaucratic inability to pass indigenous rights provisions, the Zapatistas have boldly taken control by implementing their rights through their own Good Government Juntas. Of course, the struggle continues. The most recent news comes from an article in UK's newspaper, *The Guardian*, reporting that Marcos has emerged from his four year silence to spread the message of indigenous autonomy and revolutionary action to even more students, workers, and indigenous communities. The Zapatistas will embark on the first cross-country tour since 2001, when Zapatista delegates entered Mexico City to meet with the Congress and were met by 100,000 supporters upon arrival. Marcos states this new tour will aim "not to draw lines... [and not to] promote the armed fight in another state... [but] to go and ask the people what they think and how their problems are being resolved."³¹ Resolving the problems of human poverty, marginalization, and loss of political voice from their roots is the continuing goal the Zapatista movement. As Commandante Tacho envisions, "we [Zapatistas] are for a new way of making politics; a new way in which peace is not seen as a synonym for saying, 'war is over,' but something in which the problems have been solved."³²

So while the Zapatista cause continues to provide support for the indigenous of Chiapas, they also aim to inspire others facing marginalization to take a stand for their rights. So far Zapatista inspiration has been proven successful. As *The Nation* reports,

What began with the Zapatista uprising...has surfaced in Ecuador, Guatemala and especially Bolivia where... 1.5 million Indians live in autonomous communities where official government structures have virtually faded away³³

As word of the movement for autonomy spread through Central America, other indigenous populations united to attract NGO attention to their struggles and locations. In Guatemala today there are hundreds of NGOs operating that "are organized by the people to enforce the law."³⁴ These advances for other indigenous movements provide hope that autonomy is not exclusive to the Zapatistas. Furthermore, the Zapatistas have accomplished their goal of inspiring other movements through living an example of a successful, people's led resistance movement.

Conclusion

The current trend in the world, as economies integrate, is that the rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer. It is no secret, as it was published in United Nations Human Development Report 2005, that "40% of the worlds population account for 5% of the global income [while] the richest 10%... account for 54%"³⁵ In light of these figures, one can assume that the richest 10% not only control the wealth, but allocate the political and economic power to benefit their interests. The Zapatista movement is so universally inspiring and relevant because it speaks to the 40% of the world's marginalized population and demonstrates response these conditions of oppression. The Zapatista Movement began in a hopeless situation, with NAFTA threatening to take away indigenous rights and

an insurgency of only over one thousand fighters. Things weren't so dismal for the Zapatistas, as they soon had the majority of the world behind them through the globalized networks of communication on their side. Thus, the Zapatistas' "war of the flea" has become the "war of the swarm" through international media support, networks of internet communication, and NGO work.³⁶ The Zapatistas have created a governing community structure for themselves, a community in which they have control over their lives otherwise deemed inconsequential by the flow of market forces. Like fighting fire with fire, the Zapatistas were able to overcome the dangers of economic globalization through the communication networks which it provided and proved that resistance to inequality is still possible in today's world. ■

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The Mass Killing and Genocide Index

Tyler Stansfield Jagers

Genocide must be analyzed thoroughly in order to be confronted. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was created in order to “prevent and punish” genocide (CPPCG Article 1). The CPPCG lacks the ability to force nation-states to stop genocide domestically or internationally. To use military force to intervene during genocide requires a substantial commitment of financial and military resources. These resources are scarce and the nature of the international system dictates that nation-states must intervene on their own accord or in coalitions. Therefore policymakers calculate whether or not stopping genocide is in their best political interests.

An index is necessary to assist policymakers and concerned citizens in difficult analysis of genocide. One difficulty is that domestic groups who create foreign policy are fragmented by their very nature on the subject of genocide. This is because genocide is not yet integrated into the domestic consciousnesses of industrialized nations. For this reason, the Mass Killing and Genocide Index will serve as an index to assist in the analysis and evaluation of genocide.

Background

Genocides threaten economic, social and political interests. Not only are the lives of people who are directly attacked in jeopardy, but the economic interests of regional neighbors are also threatened. Currently Rwanda has military personnel in Darfur. This is because of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Rwandan government has learned from experience that genocide can spread rapidly and disrupt both trade and regional stability.

In February of 2005, the Rwandan Minister of State for Cooperation, Protais Mitali discussed the Rwandan troops in Sudan with Omar el-Bashir. Protais. Mitali said,

Our two ministers of foreign affairs will sign an agreement of cooperation about different issues like agriculture, irrigation, trade, energy... They can discuss the situation in Darfur because, as you know, we have a force there. We have around 300 people (there). (RWANDA/SUDAN)

The reason for the Rwandan forces in Darfur was because the Rwandan President Paul Kagame knew first hand how rapidly the genocide in Rwanda proliferated. Paul Kagame was the Head General of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994. The genocide spread quickly from village to village. It is little known that in “the 13 weeks after April 6th 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans were murdered” (Economist 25). This explains why the Rwandan Defense Forces are currently preparing to send more troops into Darfur.

An index to analyze how quickly a genocide is growing and metastasizing would be a tremendous asset to policymakers. Such an index will enable policymakers, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and lobby groups to track rapid changes to genocide(s) and then act accordingly.

Core Factors

Several core factors must be further clarified before delving into the Mass Killing and Genocide Index (MKGI). These core factors include genocide, ethnic cleansings and mass killings. There are major differences between a mass killing, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Article 2 of the CPPCG defines genocide, “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group...”

It is important to understand that genocide can sometimes overlap ethnic cleansing. In Bosnia during 1992, rape was a form of ethnic cleansing. Rape as a method to determine the ethnicity of a

human population is a form of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansings are defined as, “The systematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide” (Petrovic 4)

The rape of Bosnian women in Serbian camps in April of 1992 was part of an “ethnic cleansing” (Petrovic 2). One consequence of the rapes included the disruption of Bosnian gene pools. The rapes were acts of genocide because they were, “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (CPPCG Article 2-d). This overlap is proof of why defining core factors is vital to the success of any index relating to genocide. Figure 1 assists in the visualization of the core factors of mass killing, ethnic cleansing and genocide.




Figure 1. Visualization of the Core Factors of Mass Killing, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocide

Mass killings are relative to genocide and ethnic cleansing. It is difficult to find a strict definition for mass killing. The difficulty in finding an inert definition for mass killing is due to the term’s relative broadness. On the same token the broadness of the term mass killing will be useful later in the Mass Killing and Genocide Index.

Figure 1 postulates that mass killing may overlap with genocide and ethnic cleansing. Mass killings are not necessarily genocides or ethnic cleansings, but can be equally destructive and disruptive. That is why the factor mass killing is integral to the Mass Killing and Genocide Index.

Variables in the Mass Killing and Genocide Index

The Mass Killing and Genocide Index (MKGI) is a mathematical formula. It requires variables in the form of numerical data. The three primary variables include, *destroyed population* (d), *distorted population* (o) and the *total population* (t). Before going into further detail into the intricacies of the MKGI formula it is important to clarify each variable.

The first variable *destroyed population* (d) includes the number of people in a targeted group that have been killed. Note how in the preceding Venn diagram *destroyed population* fits within the logical circle of mass killings.

The second variable is *distorted population* (o). This variable includes refugees, imprisoned groups and impregnated victims of systematic rape. These factors are less static and will change dynamically in any major ethnic or religious conflict.

The third and final variable is the *total population* (t). For the purposes of the MKGI the *total population* (t) variable is limited to the total number of estimated people targeted within the confines of the regional conflict. The goal is to make the MKGI an unbiased barometer for mass killings and genocides. The MKGI itself will not be able to determine whether or not genocide in its purest definition is taking place, but rather the MKGI will serve as a tool for interested parties to make educated decisions based on freely available information.

$$\frac{\text{destroyed population } (d) + \text{distorted population } (o)}{\text{total population } (t)} * 10 = \text{MKGI}$$

Figure 2. The Mass Killing and Genocide Index

The Mass Killing and Genocide Index is a newly conceived formula for the purpose of analyzing mass killings and genocide. Note how the variable *destroyed population (d)* is added to *distorted population (o)*. This is due to how population destruction and distortion are valued equally in the MKGI. The MKGI does not place extra value on either variable. The formula is calculated as follows:

1. Add variables *(d)* and *(o)*.
2. Divide the sum of variables *(d)* and *(o)* by the total population *(t)*.
3. Multiply the product by a factor of 10.

If calculated correctly the MKGI yield a number varying from 0 to 10. The MKGI number is a continuum of distorted and destroyed populations in a region. No populations are distorted or destroyed with a MKGI value of 0. A MKGI value of 10 means that the entire population of a regional group has been either complete distorted, destroyed or both.

Multiple MKGI numbers can be calculated over time and used in determining trends over time. Policymakers, Non-Governmental Organizations and lobby groups will be able to analyze MKGI trends and gauge how fast a regional genocide and/or mass killing is spreading.

Conclusion

The Mass Killing and Genocide Index is not a solution to the problem of genocide. Policymakers, Non-Governmental Organizations and lobby groups carry the burden of utilizing the information gleaned from the MKGI. The MKGI can paint trends and assist in the analysis of data so decision makers can halt genocide proliferation. ■

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A Look at India's Water Shortage

Christopher Lockrem

The people of India have coped with water scarcity for several millennia through mostly locally controlled systems of cooperation. However, the people of today's India, particularly the poor, face an increasing growing water crisis of epic proportions. Much of this is due to overall population growth and rising living standards among the middle-class. However, a lot of it is due to a change in the way patterns of water collection and distribution are decided. Decision-making has shifted from a style that is more democratic, and traditional-knowledge based, to one that is centralized, less democratic, market-driven and unsustainable.¹ Furthermore, Indian water policy has had, and continues to have a negative impact on the water supply of Bangladesh, putting its dense and particularly indigent population at risk. To the extent that India's government continues this trend, it not only imperils its environment and many of its people directly, but also potentially increases the unwanted immigration of desperate Bangladeshi refugees.

Historically, before the arrival of colonization and particularly under the British in the 1800's, decisions regarding the collection, storage, and distribution of water were made locally and collectively. Every individual took part in the maintenance and repair of the storage and canal systems, and paid a portion of his or her grain harvest into a fund, most of which stayed within the village. Water was considered a common resource essential to life, beyond the reach of private ownership. As part of an adaptive response, drought-resistant crops, like the cereal grain pearl millet, sorghum—a grass, and pulses like the nutritious black gram bean, were cultivated over thousands of years.¹ In a nutshell, localized control of water and agricultural decisions allowed communities to adapt as needed to environmental conditions.²

This ability to adapt was lost when the British arrived in the 1830's and imposed their hegemony upon villagers. Where before, India's "General Fund" supplied and distributed with local control, the British compelled the villagers to pay a larger percentage of their grain for water systems that were more grandiose, but often failed, due in large part to a lack of willingness by locals to maintain a system of which they had not control.¹

Democratic control eroded even further under the agricultural transformation known as the Green Revolution, which led India from being a country rife with food shortages to becoming a major regional food producer, and spurring population growth in the process.³ The tools: huge investments in technology and the adoption of high-yielding cash crops, facilitated through centralized government decision-making, and outside investment from the World Bank. Although the major transition took place between 1967 and 1978, the course of action was launched on the heels of India's Independence from Britain in 1947 under the direction of India's first prime and national hero, Jawaharlal Nehru. It is helpful to examine two events that perhaps incited Nehru's Administration to so ardently pursue of the Green Revolution.

The first was the Bengal Famine, in which an estimated 3.5 million Bengalis starved to death as a result of a food shortage in 1943. Bengal, which territorially covers what is known today as the Indian state of West Bengal and the sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh,⁴ was still under British occupation at the time. Contributing to the disaster was a number of factors, most of which were man-made. Nature provided the October 1942 tsunami, a five-meter high tide that swamped the lower Ganges delta, wiping out Bengal's winter harvest in the process. The shortage of food was exacerbated by a lengthy list of manmade features. Many of these were related to Great Britain's involvement in World War II, but other features are a result of defective or dispassionate decision-making by Great Britain.⁵

In March of 1942, British control over Burma (Myanmar), was wrested away by the Japanese, who summarily halted Burmese rice imports into Bengal. Amidst growing fears that Japan might invade, and already-present anxiety over the emerging Indian Independence movement, Great Britain made a number of decisions that would figure prominently in the Famine.⁵

The first was the installment of the Boat-Denial Scheme, which confiscated 66,500 boats, thus bringing economic ruin to the area. In the countryside, up to 180,000 peasants were displaced by the flood of refugees, civilians, and British troops coming from the eastern war front. As the government began to make large purchases of rice in the countryside, market forces took hold, sending the price of rice beyond the means of the peasants. The situation was exacerbated further with the Rice-Denial Scheme put in place by the British, which denied imported rice to the area from other parts of India.⁵

Meanwhile, there were efforts by the British Viceroy of India and the British military commander for Southeast Asia, to bring attention to the impending disaster, but with Churchill's opposition to any changes in Bengal policy, the millions were left to die,⁵ despite India's contribution of 2.5 million of its own troops to Britain's war effort.⁶

If the Bengal famine didn't spur governmental action, 1943 was also the year that the Damodar River flooded the area surrounding Kolkata (Calcutta) with six to seven feet of seasonal monsoon water. Known as the Sorrow of Bengal, the river cut off road and rail alike, leaving Kolkata stranded. It also damaged communication lines with the British army, who were fighting the Japanese in nearby occupied-Burma. The British had been wrestling over the issue of flood control since they arrived in the late 1700's, but time and time again, the price to mitigate for flood control was deemed too steep.⁷

With the twin disasters in mind, the Indian government got serious, and recruited the services of an American public corporation known as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to help develop a plan to harness the river for flood control, as well as for irrigation water, hydropower, and navigation via the river.⁸ The TVA was the entity created under the TVA act of 1933, and was charged with implementing the largest development project in U.S. history. It transformed 650 miles of river valley and created a network of multi-use dams for irrigation, hydropower, and navigational use.⁹ It was and continues to be controversial, due in part to environmental concerns, but more so for the many constitutional questions it brings up regarding land rights and the use of eminent domain.^{9,10} The scope and controversy that surrounded the TVA predicts the maladies of today's Indian water policy.

The venture that would result from India's consultation with the TVA is the Damodar (River) Valley Act⁸ (DVC), which was charged first with flood control, and with the corollary duties of irrigation and hydroelectric power generation.⁸ However, flood control has now been relegated to third in priority. In all, four dams plus a barrage for additional irrigation were to be built. DVC's role in energy production expanded over the years. Today, it operates not only hydroelectric power plants, but also gas turbine and coal-powered plants (the Valley is home to about 95% of India's high-rank coal resources).¹¹

Today, DVC is trying to push through the approval of a fifth dam, which is about to be built on the nearby Barakar River above the centrally located Maithon dam, to mitigate siltation problems, particularly associated with upper valley deforestation¹². The possibility that siltation might be a present day problem that was predicted long ago by Keki Bhattacharya, a prominent civil engineer.¹³ As Bhattacharya became more and more familiar with the DVC project, he began to write articles warning that Calcutta was a viable port only because the Damodar and other incoming rivers had enough water to carry their silt load out to sea. He correctly predicted that interfering with the flow of the Damodar would make necessary a barrage upstream at Farakka on the Indian side of the Ganges, and that this would create tension with India's neighbor, Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan).¹³

India's decision to build the Farakka barrage was unilateral, and without consultation with the Bangladeshi government. Following completion in 1974, India asked for and received permission from

Bangladesh to initiate a test diversion in 1975 from April 21 to May 31 at a rate of 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second).¹⁴ Without permission, India continued to divert water at full capacity of 40,000 cusecs throughout the dry season of 1975-76, and Bangladesh was forced to make an appeal to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.¹⁴ The resulting 1977 Ganges Water Agreement assured Bangladesh 34,500 of 55,000 available cusecs, with an additional provision that even in lean years it would receive 80% of its Ganges share. However, the agreement was made for only five-year increments. Since 1988, negotiations have been inconsistent, largely over what constitutes a “dry season,” creating criticism and resentment, particularly in Bangladesh.¹⁴

This is best understood when considering Bangladesh was once a part of pre-Independent Indian Bengal, cross-border solidarity amongst Bengalis still exists.¹⁵ A closer examination of the cross-border Bengali relationship reveals how the Indian government's centrist decision-making trends adversely affect Bangladesh. That the people of Bangladesh are poor is common knowledge. At least 45% of the Bangladeshi population lives below the poverty line, compared with 25% in India, and 12% in the US. Two-thirds of its labor force works in agriculture.¹⁶ Bangladesh, which is surrounded by India with West Bengal in the west, Meghalaya in the north, and Assam, Mizoram and Manipur in the east, is in the unfortunate position of being the lower riparian state, and being a flat alluvial plain, lacks the option of large reservoir storage, or the money for intricate canals.¹⁷

Making things worse for Bangladesh is the widespread catastrophic arsenic contamination in half of its ten million tubewells,¹⁸ which has exposed 40 million Bangladeshis.¹⁹ This number may still be low, as there are 128 million that live in the countryside with no national health care. It seems that arsenic travels via the Ganges from the Himalayas, where it is harmlessly deposited underground for thousands of years. However, there was a major campaign in the early 1970s initiated by UNICEF, the World Bank, and other international agencies, to replace open ponds with tube wells throughout Bangladesh for the purpose of mitigating water-borne diseases that were killing 250,000 children every year. Unfortunately, there was no testing for arsenic (the Bank has said that testing was never done, prior to 1993).¹⁸ The Bangladeshi government and International organizations are still trying to sort out how many people will be affected. Scientists speculate that cancer rates will at least double, and predict tens or hundreds of thousands may die as a result. Officials say it may take as many as 30 years to test all the suspected wells, and detection may go unnoticed until lesions (looking very much like leprosy) become noticeable.¹⁸

The solution for safe drinking water won't be easy. For its part, the Bank is loaning Bangladesh \$32.4 million to help improve infrastructure, improve health care, and search for a plan to mitigate arsenic poisoning.²⁰ Deeper tube wells will not be a total solution, as the arsenic has been found at both shallow and deep levels. Bangladesh has another problem: The Sundarbans are sinking, and in large part because of India's unilateral decision-making on water policy. The Sundarbans Mangroves is the largest mangrove forest in the world, though it is only half the size it once was, due largely to clearing for agricultural purposes.²² Lining the coasts of both Bangladesh and India's West Bengal, it is an important source of livelihood for 500,000 people, who fish, harvest trees, and collect honey and *Nypa* (palm) leaves.²³ Additionally, 2.5 million people live within and around the mangrove forests. Among the fauna are 42 species of mammals, including 40,000 Rhesus monkeys, 20,000 boars, 80,000 spotted deer and a population of more than 350 Bengal tigers, the largest population of its kind in the world.²⁴

The Sundarbans are sinking at a rate of 3.14 cm annually, compared to 2 mm worldwide.²⁵ There are many causes—climate change and rising sea level, tree harvesting (both legal and illegal), and prawn farming. But in addition to these causes and perhaps the key factor, is India's Farakka barrage, which continues to reduce water flow considerably during the dry season, yet releases water during the monsoon season (recalling that flooding in the Himalayas has increased due to deforestation). As velocity and water volume is reduced, so is the ability of the Ganges to carry sediment load and counteract the tidal influx of brackish water.²⁶

As distributaries become choked with silt, they begin to die, harming the health of wetlands and mangroves. This is happening all over Bangladesh; As many as 28% of its rivers have “died” due to prolonged siltation stemming from India’s diversion projects on its transnational rivers (54 of 54) with Bangladesh.²⁶ Increased salinity has been found as far inland as 125 miles,²⁴ affecting drinking water supplies,²⁷ crop production, water navigation (half of commodities are transported this way) and stunting Sundarbans mangrove growth.²⁶

It has been suggested that dredging could ease the situation. Dredging is a mechanized process where the bottoms of heavily silted river bottoms are excavated. Still, dredging only treats the symptoms, while ignoring the problem.²⁶ Additionally, as the Sundarbans continue to degrade, so will its ability to mitigate natural disasters such as floods, like the one in 1998 that submerged two-thirds of Bangladesh for three months; and cyclones like the one that killed more than 300,000 in 1970, or the one that killed over 138,000 in 1991.²¹

Adding to Bangladeshi anxiety over worsening environmental problems is India’s ongoing discussion regarding the creation of a water grid, which would link up to thirty of India’s major rivers. Until recently, the idea included not only the Ganges, but the Brahmaputra and the Meghna River as well. Being the upper riparian state, India theoretically could have made unilateral decisions regarding these rivers much like it did with the Farakka Barrage. Indeed, it looked like this was a possibility, given the Indian government’s lack of initiative to meet with its Bangladeshi counterparts.²⁸

There has been progress, or at least lip service in the face of mounting Bangladeshi and international criticism, that India will cooperate with the spirit of the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,²⁹ with respect to the “Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm” to the transnational rivers entering Bangladesh.³⁰ At the Indo-Bangla water talks last September, India’s Bangladeshi-borne Union Minister for Water Resources spoke emotionally at the press conference, declaring that India “will not do anything against the interest of Bangladesh.” He also made efforts to ease concern over the Tipaimukh dam, saying that its purpose would be for hydroelectricity and flood control over in the northeast of Bangladesh, not for irrigation (implying that flow into Bangladesh would not be affected), and indicated more cooperation on existing projects, including the Farakka.²⁹

The change in rhetoric is promising, given Bangladesh’s demographic situation. Its fertility rate had dropped, from 6.6% in 1970, to 3.46% today,³¹ but its large population base is still expected to grow from today’s 144 million to 204 million by 2025.³² All of this is occurring in an area that has one of its highest population densities in the world: 954/sq. km, compared to 307/sq. km in India, and 45/sq. km worldwide.³³ Given the catastrophes of dying rivers, arsenic and salinity contamination in drinking and agricultural supplies, diminishing navigability, floods and cyclones, it would behoove India’s leaders to recognize that if current trends continue, India risks a flood of desperate Bangladeshi refugees.

As the Indian government is making attempts to reassure Bangladeshi leadership that they will be consulted on transnational river issues, resistance to large-scale dam projects continues to grow. A central overall complaint is that decisions have been made unilaterally—at the behest of large entities like the World Bank, but without the consultation or approval of the local populations, and without transparency. It could be argued that the very nature of a large dam project is undemocratic. On the collection and distribution end, there is a shift from free and equal access to a large variety of sources, to a closed system where the process of collection and distribution of water is controlled by a centralized single party. On the financial end, there is the requirement of financial investment, which necessitates a cultural shift from one of water rights, to one of water commoditization.¹

From the indigenous point of view, there is also a lack of regard to traditional knowledge, which in India is age-old and particular to the many varied landscapes it possesses. This engenders a practical

mistake, in which useful information such as communal adaptive devices are ignored.¹ Additionally, the disregard creates an atmosphere that is adversarial, jeopardizing any given project. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it violates the principle of common dignity as afforded by the UN's High Commission for Human Rights (HCHR), which among other things says:

The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands, which they traditionally occupy, shall be recognized. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have *traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities...*

Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such *relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent*. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such *relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned...*

When... return is not possible, as determined by agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, through appropriate procedures, these peoples *shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal* to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. *Where the peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate guarantees.*³⁴

Notwithstanding the unilateral temperament of India's government, India is a signatory of the above declaration of October 1945.³⁵ The agreement provides a legal argument for the indigenous, recognizing their rights to be informed, to consent, to have representation in the proceedings, and when all else fails, to be compensated in land, or money if the indigenous party chooses.

Another example that reflects unilateral decision-making is the Tipaimukh dam, which is to be a high dam of 534 feet³⁶ (the heights of our Grand Coulee and Hoover, dams are 550 ft³⁷ and 726 ft³⁸, respectively), with its reservoir capacity 75% higher than Bhakra.³⁶ This is the dam that Prime Minister Nehru called "the temple of modern India."³⁹ Located in the northeast state of Manipur, the dam is expected to cost US\$129.10 billion.⁴⁰ Surplus hydroelectricity has now supplanted flood control as the primary purpose. Initially, the Manipur government rejected the project based on feared environmental impacts, and because the site sits on an active fault zone where the authorities expect an earthquake of 7.5 magnitude.⁴¹ However, the Manipur government changed its mind, and is now working in cooperation with the government of India to implement the dam project, after having been assured a share of free energy from the project, and amid substantial local opposition and charges that the decision making process has been anything but transparent.⁴¹

Though not well documented in international news, there is a very determined set of activists groups—most of them who are homegrown indigenous people, who have serious qualms regarding the large dam, as well as the planning process that brought it. Ecologically speaking, there are charges of neglect and disinformation. The 1984 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which was causal in part for the original rejection of the project, was found to be lacking field studies of the fauna and flora of the area, and generally misleading in its report regarding biodiversity.⁴² There is concern that up to 40% of the Kaylam Sanctuary, which is home to the Capped Langur, the Hoolock Gibbon, and contains prime habitat for three species of hornbills, will be submerged before proper assessment can be finished.⁴¹ In total area, 293.56 sq km will be submerged,⁴¹ drowning out along the way two rivers, five lakes, at least 18 villages, thus devastating the livelihoods of at least 60,000 people.⁴³ Movement groups like Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) and the Citizens Concern for Dams and Development (CCCD) are claiming that even today there has not been a proper EIA done. Additionally, they are demanding a more careful study of the viability of installing a high dam in an earthquake zone. Again, the thrust of the outrage is about the lack of consultation. There are consistent and numerous charges that the deal was signed in secret.⁴⁴

Of the many dam projects underway in India today, the most well known and controversial is the multi-dams project in the Narmada Basin, situated in the states of Madhya Pradesh (MP), Gujarat, and Maharashtra. Originally there was a plan in 1965 put forth by the Khosla committee to build the 161.5 meter high Navagam dam, but multiple disagreements regarding water-sharing and cost-sharing, much of it due to MP's concerns over submergence, kept the plan on hold until 1969, when the Government of India put in place the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT).⁴⁵ However, there were still disagreements about dam height (the higher the dam, the greater the submergence and lost land) and water distribution for another ten years, until there was finally an agreement made by the state governments in 1979, to build a dam with a height of 138.6 meters.⁴⁵ However, the full plan of the project did not emerge until the late 80's. The Navagam dam project had evolved to a multi-dam project that would include 30 large dams (100 meters [M] or higher), 135 medium dams (50M-100M high), and 3000 small dams (up to 50M high) on the Narmada and its tributaries.⁴⁵ The NWDT puts the total cost (overruns are common in Indian dam-building) at US\$3.026 trillion, and says that the project will irrigate 5 million acres and generate up to 3,000 megawatts of hydroelectricity.⁴⁶ The sheer size of the scheme engenders ample room for governmental missteps in environmental, technical and political handling. Even if the government's estimate that 40,000,000 million residents will benefit in access to electricity and/or drinking water, the pathway for those supplanted by the dams to benefit from this is not assured.⁴⁷

The largest dam of them all is the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP), which will submerge 93,134 acres of riverbed (34%), agricultural (30%) and forest land (32%).⁴⁶ NWDT asserts that of the 245 villages that will be submerged, some of them will be only partially submerged, or submerged during high water levels only. In all, it estimates a total that over 127,000 will be displaced,⁴⁶ although this does not include those that will lose their livelihood as a result. In total, there will be hundreds of thousands affected,⁴⁸ as many as 500,000 by the SSP alone, and as many as 1,500,000 displaced by dams being built in the Narmada Basin overall.⁴⁹

The local group known as the Narmada Bachao Andolan ([NBA] Save the Narmada Movement), mobilized in the mid-80's in reaction to what it saw was unjust taking of their land, without a seat at the table of decision making. Since then the movement has grown in notoriety, with international coalitions like the Friends of River Narmada. It is unlikely that any regular PBS viewer has escaped the images of villages being submerged, sometimes with people remaining in flooding houses out of protest.⁵⁰

Beyond the environmental implications, and the lack of discretionary power afforded to those being displaced, the big issue is resettlement, or lack thereof. In 1979 the NWDTA (Award) mandated that all those impacted by the dams on the Narmada would be rehabilitated one year before submergence, and included land-for-land compensation for landowners who would lose at least 25% of their land, but failed to include women (single, and co-entitlements to married women).⁵¹ Since then, the policy has somewhat morphed, and now indicates a six-month waiting period instead of a year.⁵¹ Women are still for the most part victims of bias.⁵²

Construction of the SSP is done incrementally, in segments of height. Progressing to the next level is supposed to be approved as those displaced from the previous submergence have been resettled and rehabilitated. Things have not been going according to plan, however. For instance, approval has been given to raise the SSP's current height of 110.64 meters to 121.92 meters high, despite the fact that many of those already displaced by the prior submergence have not been resettled.⁵¹

For the few that have been relocated, there are reports that say the land is not cultivatable or has not been invested with proper infrastructure. There have even been charges by villagers who say they were shown one land parcel and signed new deeds based on that land, but were given completely different land parcels.

There is a general feeling that the government has made promises it could not deliver, as documented in the aforementioned Frontline piece. Ironically, it was recently discovered that the government in Gujarat is preparing to lease 4,600,000 hectares of land to industrialists, of which 2,000,000 is arable, while at the same time denying requests to replace resettlement land that is not cultivatable.⁵³

From a global perspective, there is a growing consensus that large dam projects may not be the best way to go in the first place, especially when they are sold to the public as multi-purpose dams. As both Arundhati Roy and Shiva point out, there are fundamental conflicts between the purported purposes of flood control, irrigation, and hydroelectric generation.¹ To have maximum generation, the dam needs to be full. Irrigating takes water from the reservoir, diminishing the generation potential. Likewise, a full dam does not suit flood control. Therefore, if one starts with a full dam after the monsoon season waters come in, then irrigates, the potential of hydro electrical generation diminishes as the dry months wind down. If the monsoon rains fail, the dam is empty, meaning no irrigation, and no hydro electrical generation.⁴⁹

Moreover, dam projects may not be enough to fulfill the growing water needs that India faces. In fact many think that large dams will only make the problems of flood and drought worse, as it has in Bangladesh. There are many things from the past that could be brought back to help. A return back to drought-resistant crops would help. There are those that would complain that diverting attention away from cash crops would affect economic growth, but most of the growth right now is in the technology sector. And growth might be part of the problem anyhow. According to the World Bank, 100,000 enter the middle class everyday,⁵⁴ meaning more resources (and water) to be used per capita.

Still there is another perspective worth considering; since independence up until 1990, 40% of those displaced by medium and large size dams are indigenous tribals, even though they represented only 7.5% of the population. For more recent projects, several reports suggest as many as 59% of the displaced have been indigenous tribals.⁵⁵ Against the backdrop of millions of livelihoods being disrupted and even destroyed by the construction of these large dam projects, the egregious inadequacies of resettlement plans, and the unilateral and reticent approach that India tends to adopt in its decision-making, the disparate effects upon India's tribal communities has overtones of discrimination. This approach is also shortsighted from a pragmatic standpoint. While it is apparent that modern technology will continue to be part of India's water policy, it is not a silver bullet to its twin problems of flood and water shortages. Instead of working around the will of those being displaced, India should instead engage them, consult with them, and benefit from the many centuries of traditional adaptive management experience. Furthermore, it needs to consider the worsening situation in Bangladesh. Charging forward unilaterally into bigger and bigger water policy schemes will not only intensify domestic tension in India, but quite possible provoke an exodus from Bangladesh across its West Bengali border. ■

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The Threat of A Generation

Kenneth Kosakowski

In the past fifteen years, major terrorist attacks on the United States have not only been successful, but continue to increase in severity and destructiveness. The 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) killed six people and injured over one-thousand. The goal of the bombers was for Tower 1 to topple over onto Tower 2, collapsing both structures, which would have resulted in the death of thousands. The next attack, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killed 168 Americans. This attack, which seems to have faded from both the American public and US policymakers' minds, was carried out by homegrown terrorists with frightening ease. The attacks on the US Pentagon and the WTC in 2001 were the deadliest terrorist attacks in human history, killing over 3,000 men, women, and children.

When examining the severity of terrorist actions during the past fifteen years, one can ask, "What is next?" The answer is unknown. Due to the increasing destructiveness of terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies and military officials are predicting the worst. Terrorists have attempted to obtain the materials for nuclear weapons in the past, and continue to do so. The result of a nuclear attack in a major metropolitan city would be catastrophic, yet follows with the trend of increasingly severe terrorist attacks. As Figure 1 shows, while international terrorist attacks have decreased in quantity during the past two decades, they have increased in severity.




Figure 1. International Terrorist Attacks. Source: US State Department, "Patterns of Global Terrorism"

The goal of terrorist groups committing a nuclear attack on the United States would be to kill as many people as possible, cause economic collapse within their target, and the incapacitation of the US government. The realization of these goals by nuclear detonation in a major metropolitan area would cause chaos and disorder among both the population and leadership, and likely cause a chain reaction of violence around the globe.

A successful nuclear attack on the United States by a terrorist organization may be inevitable. Although the government has taken precautions against the possibility of nuclear terrorism, it has hardly been enough. The United States' vulnerability to a terrorist attack has been clearly demonstrated in the past two decades. Transforming the inevitable into an obscure possibility can only be achieved through major shifts in both policy and security measures through a global coalition of policymakers led and funded by the United States.

The desire of terrorist organizations to possess and use a nuclear weapon has been published publicly in recent years. Osama Bin Laden's terrorist group Al Qa'ida attempted to obtain nuclear materials since as early as 1993 when he offered to buy nuclear materials from South Africa.¹ This information collected from an Al Qa'ida informant Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, claimed that Bin Laden attempted to pay \$1.5 million for a cylinder of uranium in 1993.² In August 2001, Osama bin Laden received two key former officials from Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Bin Laden and his associates questioned these men about chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.³

Al Qa'ida operatives made several attempts in the late 1990's to purchase a nuclear warhead or weapons grade material from several former Soviet Union satellites in Central Asia. According to Israeli Intelligence, Bin Laden paid an agent in Kazakhstan \$2 million to deliver a suitcase nuclear device designed by the Soviets.⁴ Bin Laden's biographer has publicly stated that Bin Laden claims already claims to possess nuclear weapons and is only waiting for the opportune time to use them.⁵

Several pieces of disturbing evidence were uncovered following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The United States Intelligence community interviewed enemy combatants connected with Al Qa'ida and retrieved several key pieces of evidence outlining their nuclear ambitions. Special Forces were able to recover documents indicating that Al Qa'ida was interested in designing a nuclear device, as well as manuals discussing the openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and weapons related issues.⁶ CNN journalists uncovered a document titled "Super bomb" at a suspected Al Qa'ida leader's home, in which the author describes types of nuclear weapons, the physics of those weapons, and how to make them.⁷ CNN published the documents and concluded that Al Qa'ida was heavily pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

Al Qa'ida and other jihadi groups believe it is their duty to god to acquire nuclear weapons. The objective is clear, to kill as many infidels as possible, depose apostate regimes, and establish a "truly" Islamic state.⁸ Bin Laden has a propensity for staging dramatic terrorist attacks on symbolic targets. A nuclear attack in a major US metropolitan city is a likely follow up to the attacks on September 11, 2001.

Although Al Qa'ida is the most visible non-state actor to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, they are not alone. Several terrorist organizations around the world covet the power of nuclear weapons. The terrorist group likely to obtain nuclear capabilities next to Al Qa'ida is the separatist group operating in Russian controlled Chechnya. In 1995, Chechen separatists created a bomb from cesium-137 and dynamite and placed it in a park in downtown Moscow. The terrorists did not detonate the bomb as promised, but did alert the media about its location, where it was then located and disarmed by authorities.⁹ Additionally, the seized diary of a prominent figure in the Chechen rebel movement revealed a plot to hijack a nuclear submarine. The goal of the hijacking was to aim nuclear-armed missiles at targets throughout Russia and demand Chechen independence from Russia. There are several cases of Chechen terrorists casing nuclear power plants and research facilities in Russian and throughout Chechnya. The rebel group poses a serious threat to world security due to its close proximity within Russian territory, which gives them an opportune chance to steal nuclear materials or warheads from unsecured nuclear stockpiles.

Jemaah Islamiyah is a militant Islamist group whose goal is to establish an Islamist state across Southeast Asia. Jemaah Islamiyah believes that the only way to achieve this goal is the removal of United States military forces and influence from the region. While there are no reports that this group has acquired nuclear weapons, a probable scenario if they were able to acquire one would be an attack against one of several strategic US military installations in Southeast Asia. If Jemaah Islamiyah were able to acquire nuclear material, the possibility of them transferring the material to other terrorist organizations is very high.

Non-Jihadi religious groups have attempted to develop or purchase nuclear weapons. The Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo had a following of millions around the world. Aum Shinrikyo was determined to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. They were successful in recruiting thousands of followers in the former Soviet Union, which included several staff members of nuclear facilities.¹⁰ The cult was unsuccessful due to total incompetence but the financial backing, personnel, and intent were in place to constitute a serious threat.

Domestic terrorist groups in the United States are often overlooked in discussions about nuclear terrorism. The destructiveness of Timothy McVeigh's actions in Oklahoma City, the Olympic Park

bombings in Atlanta, and Anthrax attack of 2001, should continue to remind law enforcement agencies and political leaders that foreign organizations are not alone in their quest to commit catastrophic terrorist attacks. It is unlikely that a terrorist group based inside the United States could purchase, plant, and detonate a nuclear weapon without detection in advance, but the scenario is not impossible to envision and deserves attention. If domestic terrorists made the decision to coordinate their efforts with a foreign organization, acquiring the nuclear materials would become a much easier task. Domestic terrorists could also provide logistics, intelligence, and perhaps operational support for a nuclear attack on US soil.

The proliferation of nuclear materials should be the number one concern for those charged with the responsibility of protecting American lives. Theft or the diversion of nuclear weapons or materials by terrorist organizations, rogue states, or organized criminals represents a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens, allies, and interests.¹¹

The two most probable scenarios for terrorist organizations to obtain nuclear capabilities are the theft of a functional weapon or fissile material from inadequately secured nuclear site, or the direct purchase of nuclear weapons from a country or individual willing to sell it on the black market. Terrorist organizations looking to develop nuclear materials need to recruit nuclear professionals who have at least some technical know how to carry out their goals. The majority of these professionals are unemployed or struggling to get by in the former Soviet Union. These scenarios while preventable are becoming increasingly difficult to detect and interdict.

Where would terrorists get the materials necessary to build nuclear weapons? The primary source for nuclear material would be the former Soviet Union. Russia possesses more nuclear weapons and weapons making material than any country in the world.¹² The security measures at the majority of Russian nuclear sites are suspect at best. With the fall of the USSR, nuclear materials have dispersed over its massive countryside, from the Ukraine to Kazakhstan, and east to the Kamchatka peninsula. Russia's large area, huge nuclear stockpiles, unemployed scientists, and corrupt military commanders were at the time, simply too much for a transitional government to properly police. This observation continues to hold true in 2006.

The US intelligence community reported in 2002 of at least four confirmed cases of weapons-grade and weapons-usable materials have been stolen from Russian institutes.¹³ The same report also acknowledged the fact that smuggling operations did take place that were undetected, but they had no way of knowing the frequency or magnitude.¹⁴ Poor security at the facilities coupled with a lack of living wages for those who are in charge of securing it; provide terrorists with relatively easy targets to reach their nuclear goal.

The United States has taken some steps to curtail the threat of nuclear proliferation from Russia. Former US Senator Sam Nunn and current US Senator Richard Lugar created the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program or simply the Nunn-Lugar initiative in 1992. Three main goals of the program were to assist Russia in safeguarding their nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the development of an agenda for mutual joint destruction of chemical and biological weapons, and to create non-weapons jobs for unemployed scientists and engineers in Russia.¹⁵ This program demonstrated that relying on detection measures to safeguard the global population against "loose nukes" is a weak defense at best. The most effective way to protect against such an attack is to prevent the material from leaving the sites where it is supposed to be in the first place.¹⁶ While the Nunn-Lugar program has made significant headway, it does not receive adequate funding needed to put all of its goals into action. The program faces both annual cuts in funding, and inexplicable indifference by the Bush administration while no comparable program has been implemented to combat the threat.¹⁷

Non-Governmental Organizations who recognize such threats posed by "loose nukes" have taken positive steps in reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation. One of these programs geared towards

Russian disarmament is the Megatons to Megawatts Program. The program is maintained by a private organization, which oversees the conversion of Russian uranium into fuel for nuclear reactors in the United States. Estimates report that 10% of US electric power comes from the converted nuclear fuel.¹⁸ The Megatons to Megawatts program is the brainchild of private citizens of the United States and has yet to receive proper funding or attention from the US government.

While Russia has been a cooperative partner in non-proliferation, Pakistan defines credible threat in the minds of US policymakers involved in non-proliferation. Pakistan has clandestine networks around the world for both the acquisition and sale of nuclear material and technology in North Korea, China, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁹ The father of the “Islamic Nuclear Bomb”, Dr. A.Q. Khan, has been in the forefront of proliferation of nuclear expertise. This includes disseminating centrifuge plans that Khan stole while working at a Dutch nuclear plant in the 1970’s.

According to CIA reports in 2002, Pakistan flew US supplied C-130s to acquire Nodong missile parts in Pyongyang, South Korea.²⁰ Pakistan also stands accused of running “oil for nukes deals” with Saudi Arabia who supplied most of the funding for Pakistan’s nuclear program.²¹ US policymakers have been still been reluctant to take a hard line with Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. Since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Musharraf has been a crucial ally in the region against Al Qa’ida operatives. His recent alliance with the United States was a domestically unpopular decision and has resulted in several assassination attempts in recent years. Musharraf is not the ideal ally for the US; however, the thought of an extremist regime coming to power in Pakistan and gaining control of their nuclear arsenal is of greater concern to US policymakers than past Pakistani proliferation violations.

Despite recent developments, North Korea still poses a serious threat to United States national security due to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. North Korea has repeatedly stated their intentions to become a nuclear player, and has provided weapons to anti US regimes in the Middle East and Asia. North Korea is a nation that is, if not already, then near economic collapse. Drug trafficking and weapons sales are North Korea’s cash crop. A nuclear-armed North Korea would most certainly sell off technology and weapons to bolster their economy and further threaten the United States.²²

The United States faces major challenges ahead to alter the reality of future nuclear terrorist attacks being inevitable, to becoming improbable. After 9/11, President Bush proclaimed “the gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.”²³ This statement acknowledged the gravity of the terrorist threat, but his administration has not implanted the proper policies to reduce the danger. A recent survey of non-proliferation experts conducted by Sen. Lugar stated that 30% of those polled believed that a nuclear attack would occur on the United States within the next ten years. 79% of those experts firmly believe that if there is a nuclear attack it will be conducted by terrorists and not by state actors. Lugar also posed the question whether the US government was spending enough time and resources to combat proliferation and a resounding 80% believed they were not.²⁴

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission) released a report card in December 2005 in which it assigned grades for the US government’s compliance with recommendations given by the commission in 2004. On the issue of maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the government received a “D”. On the issue of a coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, they received a “C”.²⁵ After the deaths of over 3,000 Americans in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US policymakers’ inability or unwillingness to make the necessary adjustments to combat the most significant threat of this generation is entirely unacceptable.

While reducing the terrorist threat seems to be a daunting task, it is not an impossible one. The success of the Nunn-Lugar program demonstrated what multilateral action could achieve on the issue of safeguarding nuclear material. While the Bush administration continually stress the significance

of a nuclear terrorist threat in their rhetoric, they have yet to release of a comprehensive strategy to address such a threat, or increase funding to support existing programs in place. The U.S. and its allies have made positive strides in disrupting Al Qa'ida cells and other terrorist organizations since the war on terrorism began. The 2001 version of Al Qa'ida has been significantly disrupted but their jihadi message continues to gain momentum in 2006. This is largely due to the unpopularity of U.S. policy and actions in the Middle East, which has continued to fuel recruitment of thousands of new terrorists in ever expanding areas of the planet.

The United States cannot combat nuclear terrorism unilaterally. As long as the nuclear powers insist on maintaining *these* weapons to protect their security, they cannot expect to prevent other countries and terrorist organizations from acquiring such weapons and eventually use them.²⁶ A coalition of existing nuclear powers should be organized to combat the issue of nuclear terror. Such a coalition should have broad powers to amend and adapt the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime to fit the new threats of today. The coalition's success will be dependant upon complete transparency and honesty by all involved with the intention to eradicating the threat of nuclear terror. Nuclear powers should then continue take measures to ensure the threat of these weapons and threats are removed entirely by gradually reducing their arsenals and halting research of new generation weapons.²⁷

The United States enjoyed overwhelming global support after 9/11, and the construction of a coalition should have been the first objective after the successful invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration squandered an opportunity for such a coalition by acting unilaterally with questionable intelligence to invade Iraq. The administration's actions alienated old and new allies who questioned the significance of the invasion, and the motives of the United States. The foreign policy focus of the United States should be the reparation of fractured alliances through open dialogue on the importance of improving weapons security, coordinating intelligence efforts, and working multilaterally to address a threat that will affect us all. ■

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